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Abstract
Individuals from democratic states who flee state prosecu-
tion and seek refugee status in Canada face significant 
challenges in obtaining asylum. There is a strong presump-
tion that the legal system of their country of nationality 
will provide adequate procedural safeguards. This pre-
sumption extends to US military deserters who refused to 
serve in Iraq. The consequence is that numerous claimants 
have been denied over the past decade.
This article contends that where the feared prosecution 
relates to a political crime, there should not be a presump-
tion of state protection. Furthermore, the article posits and 
discusses why desertion should constitute a pure political 
crime much like treason, sedition, or espionage. Lastly, the 
article argues, pursuant to United Nations policies, that 
such deserters should be able to obtain refugee status only 
where their desertion constitutes a refusal to be associated 
with military actions that are internationally condemned 
as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct.
Résumé
Les personnes originaires de pays démocratiques fai-
sant face à des poursuites font face à plusieurs difficultés 
lorsqu’elles fuient leur pays et font une demande d’asile au 
Canada. Il y a en effet une forte présomption que le sys-
tème légal de ces pays peut assurer une procédure judiciaire 
sécuritaire et équitable. Ces présomptions s’appliquent 
également dans le cas des militaires américains qui ont 
déserté pour éviter de servir en Irak. Plusieurs demandes 
d’asile ont par conséquent échoué pendant la dernière 
décennie. Cet article avance qu’il ne devrait pas y avoir de 
présomption de sécurité lorsque les procédures judiciaires 
relèvent de crimes politiques. De plus, on y argumente que 
la désertion devrait être considérée comme un véritable 
crime politique, tout comme le sont la trahison, la sédition 
et l’espionnage. Enfin, cet article montre, en accord avec les 
politiques des Nations Unies, que les déserteurs devraient 
obtenir le statut de réfugié seulement lorsque leur déser-
tion consiste en un refus de participer à des manœuvres 
militaires qui sont internationalement condamnées en rai-
son de principes moraux humains.
Introduction
Soldiers play important roles in the defence of their nation. However, there are reasonable legal limitations to what they should be expected to do in the name of 
defending their country or in combatting an internal insur-
gency against the state. The legal limitations can be located 
in international conventional and customary law as well 
as domestic law. Throughout history, and despite the pres-
ence and development of these norms over the past century, 
many governments (including those elected in democratic 
states) have required their soldiers to engage in armed con-
flict that is not defensive (despite claims to the contrary). 
In many other situations, even where the lawfulness of the 
armed conflict itself may not be in question, governing 
authorities have ordered soldiers to commit acts that are 
unlawful and in violation of the laws of war. Just as soldiers 
play an important role in defending their nation, they also 
serve an important function as legal agents by deserting the 
military as a way of refusing to (further) engage in unlawful 
actions that violate international norms. In these particu-
lar circumstances, they may be viewed as temporary and 
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context-dependent public office-holders at international 
law1 stepping in to act where superiors, states, and/or the 
international community have failed to do so.
Nevertheless, desertion as a form of political resist-
ance comes at a significant price to the principled military 
resister. Some will submit to the home state’s punishment, 
while others will also legitimately seek asylum in other 
countries to avoid it. There is a logical reason why soldiers 
who desert in order to refuse participation in violations of 
international law seek protection from a third-party state. 
Deserting soldiers face prosecution and potentially severe 
punishment for their resistance. In some jurisdictions, this 
includes the possibility of a death sentence.2 It is therefore 
a serious crime.3 Are such individuals eligible for polit-
ical asylum under international law? Indeed, soldiers who 
desert the military as an act of resistance to unlawful mil-
itary actions and who then seek asylum in a third-party 
state to avoid prosecution as a form of persecution in their 
countries of nationality have been deemed eligible to obtain 
refugee status under the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees4 and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.5 There is a fairly well-established juris-
prudence confirming this.6
Not every foreign military resister has been able to obtain 
this protection in Canada, however. Soldiers from fellow 
democratic states who have sought refugee status in Canada, 
for example, have been largely unsuccessful. As I discuss in 
this article, this includes US soldiers who have deserted to 
avoid (further) participation in military operations in Iraq 
following the illegal invasion of the country in 2003. When 
military resisters seek refugee status to avoid prosecution 
and punishment, they must—like all other such asylum-
seekers—prove that they have a well-founded fear of perse-
cution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.7 Yet demon-
strating a fear of prosecution for desertion may not be easily 
conducive to showing a well-founded fear of persecution.8 
It is contingent on the proof of certain elements. Asylum-
seekers must show, as part of a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, that their country of nationality is unable to provide 
adequate protection.9 In the case of US military resisters, 
many Canadian judges and adjudicators have determined 
that because the US military court system provides adequate 
protection through procedural safeguards, their claims for 
refugee status fail.10 Typically, if sufficient state protection 
is unavailable, it must be determined whether the conduct 
that is alleged to be persecutory provides an objective basis 
for a well-founded fear of persecution.11 This persecution 
must then also have a nexus to one of the above-mentioned 
convention grounds such as “political opinion.” Political 
opinion has been defined under Canadian law as “any 
opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state, gov-
ernment, and policy may be engaged.”12 The notion of what 
constitutes the “political” is heavily tied to the state. While 
desertions may be politically motivated, not all deserters 
will be considered eligible for refugee status. However, the 
UNCHR Handbook provides that where a soldier refuses 
to be associated in a military action that is internationally 
condemned as contrary to the basic rules of human con-
duct, punishment for desertion can be viewed as persecu-
tion.13 Although the UNCHR Handbook is not binding on 
states party to the Refugee Convention and/or Protocol, 
this above-mentioned provision has been applied numerous 
times in refugee cases relating to deserters and has become 
a recurring feature within the jurisprudence on deserters 
seeking refugee status.14
Given that state protection has been so critical to the 
denial of US war resisters seeking refugee status in Canada, 
in this article I focus on the analytical stage of assessing 
the existence or absence of state protection as part of the 
overall analysis of determining whether there is a well-
founded fear of persecution. Flowing from the Hinzman 
decision of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal,15 Federal 
Court of Canada justices as well as panel members at the 
Immigration and Refugee Board have determined largely 
that there is a substantial presumption that because the 
United States is a democratic state, it protects its deserting 
soldiers by providing fair and impartial trials replete with 
procedural protections.16 This approach has also received 
scholarly support from Patrick J. Glen, who contends, “U.S. 
deserters in Canada do not qualify as refugees under inter-
national or Canadian law, and should not be afforded such 
status no matter how much sympathy one may feel towards 
them.”17 For Glen (and likely many others), the “[d]eserters 
have committed a crime. Deserters’ actions cannot be justi-
fied under any acceptable rubric of refugee law.”18
In this article, I respectfully take a view different from 
Glen’s and make three arguments with respect to these cases. 
First, there should be no presumption of state protection, 
even in democratic states where the fear of state prosecution 
relates to an offence such as desertion, which is in essence a 
(pure) political crime. Flowing from the underlying ration-
ale for the political crimes exception rooted in international 
refugee law and extradition law, there is significant doubt 
that courts in the prosecuting state can be fair and impar-
tial when the target of the crime is the state itself. Second, 
assuming that the fear of prosecution for political crimes 
eliminates the presumption of state protection accorded 
to courts in an asylum-seeker’s country of nationality, I 
address whether military desertions are indeed “political 
crimes.” As I elaborate in greater detail below, desertions are 
in essence political crimes, given that the main “victim” or 
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target of an act of desertion is the state. Furthermore, such 
desertions should be designated as “pure political crimes” 
akin to offences such as treason, sedition, and espionage. 
Third, I contend that even as a pure political crime, a deser-
tion must still meet the test established in jurisprudence 
and formulated by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). That is, the desertion is one that 
is committed to avoid association with military actions 
that are internationally condemned as contrary to the basic 
rules of human conduct as set out in paragraph 171 of the 
UNHCR Handbook.19 Thus even if desertions should be 
more broadly viewed as pure political crimes as part of the 
state protection analysis, this will not mean that every such 
act will give rise to an individual obtaining refugee status if 
the requirements of paragraph 171 are not satisfied.
State Protection and Political Crimes
Underlying the concept of state protection is the belief 
that states have an obligation to protect their own citizens. 
Asylum-seekers must first seek protection from their own 
country of nationality before seeking “surrogate” protec-
tion from a third-party state.20 Typically the expectation is 
that one must first seek protection from law enforcement or 
other appropriate agencies of the executive branch charged 
with enforcing the laws in the jurisdiction. This is particu-
larly relevant where the agents of persecution are non-state 
actors or minor government actors acting perhaps in an 
unsanctioned manner. However, where the alleged agents 
of persecution are in fact law enforcement authorities them-
selves, where is the asylum-seeker to turn to? The jurispru-
dence indicates that where a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion relates to a prosecution for a crime, one is expected to 
turn to judicial authorities to ensure that a fair and impar-
tial trial is held. Yet when the offence in question is political, 
that is to say a crime that is directed primarily at the state 
or government for the purpose of challenging its policies, 
the presumption of fairness and impartiality should not be 
taken for granted.21
The presumption of state protection as a basis for rejecting 
deserting US soldiers’ claims for refugee status in Canada 
has been a recurrent issue in recent years.22 This has been 
the case specifically for the numerous US soldiers who have 
refused to serve in Iraq and more recently includes those 
refusing to return to fight in Afghanistan. The main basis 
for their rejection has been the presumption that the United 
States, as a democratic state, provides sufficient state protec-
tion through procedural guarantees of fairness during trials, 
including military proceedings.23 This then requires the 
asylum-seeker to provide “clear and convincing confirma-
tion of a state’s inability to protect.”24 Because the United 
States is presumed to be capable of protecting its own 
citizens, through the existence of an independent judiciary, 
asylum-seekers from the United States are deemed to bear a 
heavy burden in attempting to rebut the presumption that 
their state is incapable of protecting them.25
This poses an important question: can a legal system 
that can otherwise provide a fair and impartial trial in the 
prosecution of non-political offences prevent against indi-
vidual and/or institutional biases that arise when the crime 
being prosecuted is inherently a political crime?26 If it could, 
would it then not undermine the rationales underlying the 
political crimes doctrine that has developed both in extradi-
tion and refugee law? Although extradition law and refugee 
law serve and advance different purposes more generally, a 
common theme running through both legal regimes is the 
political crimes exception. At this stage it will be useful to 
consider these rationales and the relevance of the political 
crimes doctrine to refugee protection and state protection.
A central purpose of the political crimes exception, which 
developed in extradition law within the nineteenth century, 
was to protect individuals from being returned to juris-
dictions where they may be subjected to unfair trials and 
punishments because of their political opinions that form 
the basis of their actions.27 Prior to the creation of today’s 
refugee protection system founded within the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol, extradition law’s adoption of the 
political crimes exception effectively operated as a form 
of political asylum. As Lord Reid of the House of Lords 
once observed, the political crimes exception within the 
extradition context gave effect to the principle that asylum 
should be offered to political refugees.28 Extradition law’s 
protection for political refugees extends to today. Canada’s 
Extradition Act, for instance, mandates that individuals 
shall not be extradited where the purpose of the extradi-
tion is to prosecute or punish individuals because of their 
“political opinion,”29 or with respect to a “political offence 
or an offence of a political character.”30 Such protections 
do not exclude instances where the state seeking extradi-
tion is a democratic one.31 The clear assumption underlying 
the political crimes exception is that states cannot provide 
fair trials in cases where the primary nature of the crime for 
which extradition is sought is political.
The political crimes exception has also become incor-
porated within the framework of international refugee law 
through Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention.32 It states 
that the “provisions of the Convention shall not apply to any 
person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for 
considering that he committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to admission to that coun-
try as a refugee.”33 By its plain terms, the individual who 
is designated as having committed “serious non-political 
crimes” is the person whose exclusion is mandated, not the 
 Desertion as a Pure Political Crime 
95
political criminal or someone who has committed a less 
serious or minor non-political crime.34 An underlying con-
cern of the Convention’s framers was with allowing crimin-
als who have committed serious crimes to escape legitim-
ate prosecution by claiming refugee status.35 Through their 
examination of the drafting history of Article 1F(b), James 
Hathaway and Michelle Foster demonstrate that there was 
a strong correlation between political crimes within the 
extradition context and its expected role in the refugee pro-
tection regime.36 Specifically, the framers were focused on 
preventing fugitives who committed serious non-political 
crimes from availing themselves of the protections offered 
in the Convention.37 As Hathaway and Foster articulate, the 
“inclusion of the ‘non-political crime’ proviso thus furthers 
the general purpose of ensuring that only persons whose 
admission would threaten the integrity of the refugee pro-
tection system are excluded by Art. 1F(b).”38 Since political 
criminals were not viewed as bona fide fugitives from jus-
tice, they did not pose such a threat.39
In addition to the drafting history, some courts have also 
emphasized the connection between the political crimes 
exception in extradition law and refugee law.40 Indeed in 
the case of Gil v Canada, the Canadian Federal Court of 
Appeal, after extensively reviewing the political crimes 
extradition jurisprudence, adopted the legal test used in 
Anglo-American political crimes cases in extradition law 
for application in the Article 1F(b) context.41
It is worth observing that while the political crimes doc-
trine continues to exist, there have been significant inter-
national and domestic efforts to limit its scope, particu-
larly where the use of violence has been employed. In many 
cases, various crimes are explicitly excluded as qualifying as 
a political crime, including murder.42 This is regardless of 
the fact that the victim of such a crime may be a legitimate 
non-civilian target and the means employed were not dis-
proportionate. Similarly, in other instances, broadly worded 
legislation within refugee law has specifically deemed indi-
viduals inadmissible for conduct that also involves any use of 
force, regardless of the nature of the target, the nature of the 
oppression being countered, or the proportionality of the 
means adopted.43 However, despite these significant chan-
ges, military desertion has not been excluded explicitly and 
certainly does not qualify as being a violent crime.
Given this history of protecting political offenders, it 
seems reasonable that where the fear of state prosecution 
is for a political crime, the presumption of state protection 
should not come into play.44 As noted above, the political 
crimes doctrine was created in part because there were 
serious doubts that the legal systems wherein the crimes 
took place could provide fair and impartial trials to polit-
ical offenders. While it may not necessarily be the case that 
all states will be unable to provide adequate safeguards as 
part of their mandate to provide state protection, given that 
all refugees must meet the burden of establishing a well-
founded fear of persecution (which necessarily includes a 
finding of inadequate state protection), those refugees who 
fear political persecution at the hands of the state should, 
almost by definition, have a less difficult time satisfying this 
burden.45
Where soldiers are involved, the prosecutions take 
place within the specific context of courts martial. Such 
courts are seldom interested in the political motivations of 
deserting soldiers and antagonistic to (at least) open dem-
onstrations of disobedience and desertion.46 There is an 
institutional bias within the military against desertions 
and disobedience, and it is reflected in legal norms.47 Even 
where a military judge may view the conduct of the deserter 
sympathetically, there may be ramifications to such a jurist 
for legitimizing an act of desertion. In recent years, Federal 
Court of Canada decisions have held that US military 
judges lack adequate independence and thus may cater to 
the actual or perceived attitudes held by superiors toward 
deserters.48 Specifically, such judges lack security of tenure 
and sufficient institutional independence.49 As a general 
rule, tenure may be secured through fixed appointments 
and removal only for just cause. Institutional independ-
ence is marked by the tribunal’s control over the day-to-
day running of its functions. Both are missing in the US 
military court system and relevant to the issue of whether 
state protection exists. However, even assuming US military 
judges and courts had the indicia of independence, there is 
the inherent bias against desertion, given its political nature 
and the need to maintain the chain of command and disci-
pline. This is why the political crimes exception ought to 
play a role in the analysis of state protection under Article 
1A(2) of the Refugee Convention and invalidate a presump-
tion of state protection.
Certain questions still remain. Even if a prosecution for 
a political crime should give rise to a negation of the pre-
sumption of state protection in the case of political crimes, 
is desertion considered a political crime as matter of law? If 
not, should it be?
Desertion: A Pure Political Crime?
In this section, I articulate why military desertions can and 
should be considered political crimes, specifically pure pol-
itical crimes. At present they are not explicitly considered 
political crimes at all. As developed in extradition and refu-
gee law, there is a recognized distinction between “pure” 
and “relative” political crimes. Pure political crimes are 
offences aimed directly at the state: treason, sedition, and 
espionage.50 Such offences do not violate the private rights 
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of individuals.51 By contrast, relative political offences are 
“common law offences” such as murder (that do affect, by 
implication, individual rights but), are motivated by polit-
ical objectives.52 As desertions do not implicate the rights of 
other individuals (at least directly), there cannot be any basis 
for designating them as relative political crimes.  
Desertions should be considered pure political crimes 
because the main “victim” of the crime is the state. A deser-
tion is essentially the refusal to (continue to) bear arms for 
the state (or other entity to which allegiance was given). 
Desertions bear a sufficiently close relationship to acts of 
treason, sedition, and espionage such that they should be 
considered pure political crimes. An examination of these 
three offences illustrates this point. Definitions of treason, 
sedition, and espionage are not uniformly worded. Yet the 
common element is the target of these crimes—the state. 
Treason includes armed attacks on the state or the attempt 
to overthrow the government.53 Treason is also defined as 
attacks on the life of the head of state and significant pub-
lic officials.54 Sedition is designated as the advocacy to 
effect any governmental change through the use of force.55 
Espionage involves the disclosure of confidential or secret 
state information to another government without the per-
mission of the state that holds the secret.56 There will be 
instances where deserting soldiers or officials will engage 
in specifically treasonous or seditious acts as well as espio-
nage after their defection, but the act of desertion itself is 
not included within the definitions of these specific crimes.
Although these offences are likely to be driven in part, 
if not in substantial measure, by the political motivation(s) 
of the perpetrator, the presence or absence of such 
motivation(s) is not necessary for an offender to qualify 
for the “pure” political crimes exception.57 Feasibly, a paid 
assassin or mercenary who is not motivated by political 
objectives can still commit treason, sedition, or espionage 
that advances the cause of political freedom in a totalitarian 
state. There is nothing illegitimate about such hired persons 
advancing the goals of resistance to an oppressive govern-
ment and their being granted protection to avoid a politic-
ally motivated and biased trial.
Drawing from the observations above, should desertions 
qualify as pure political crimes? Like the aforementioned 
offences, desertion is a crime against the state. A soldier who 
deserts at a time of armed conflict in particular deprives the 
government or ruling authority, at minimum, of an asset 
to fight an opposing force in the said conflict. If the sol-
dier deserts for specific political reasons—for example, the 
refusal to advance the goals of an oppressive and/or illegal 
military action—it is no less a political crime than that of the 
“freedom fighter” who seeks to overthrow the government 
by force, who calls for the overthrow of the state through 
direct military action, or the spy who provides crucial data 
that will facilitate an attack on the oppressive government’s 
defences or security network. Where the deserting soldier 
is of a higher rank, the government’s interests may be fur-
ther imperilled by the danger of other soldiers being influ-
enced.58 This is of particular concern to governments that 
rely on voluntary recruitment or conscript their personnel.
As with treason, sedition, and espionage, statutes defin-
ing desertion do not require that the political motivations 
of the accused constitute an element of the offence.59 The 
subjective fault requirement is that the soldier intended to 
avoid his or her duties. Nevertheless, military desertions 
are inherently political acts. One may go so far as to say 
that regardless of the political reasons that an individual 
has deserted, the act of desertion from the military is and 
should be considered a political one by its very nature and 
its impact on the state as the “victim” or object of the offence. 
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has affirmed Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill’s position that “[m]ilitary service and objec-
tion thereto, seen from the point of view of the state, are 
issues which go to the heart of the body politic. Refusal to 
bear arms, however motivated, reflects an essentially polit-
ical opinion regarding the permissible limits of state author-
ity, it is a political act.”60
Lastly, another factor that suggests that desertion should 
be considered a political crime is the fact it has not yet been 
considered a serious non-political crime. Or, put another 
way, soldiers seeking asylum have not been excluded from 
being designated refugees by virtue of their desertion, hav-
ing been construed as a serious non-political crime. To 
recall, Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention requires 
exclusion where there are reasonable grounds to consider 
that an asylum-seeker has committed a serious non-political 
crime. Desertion is most certainly a serious offence, given 
the considerable penal consequences that may be imposed 
on a deserting soldier. If desertion is a serious non-political 
crime, it is curious that this has not been used to exclude 
soldiers seeking refugee status. It would surely be an easy 
way to exclude an individual without having to engage in an 
analysis of the claim for refugee status under Article 1A(2). 
It is a technique that decision-makers at the Immigration 
and Refugee Board have employed in other circumstances: 
exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Convention.61
Interestingly, and in connection with deserting US sol-
diers who have avoided (re)deployment in Iraq, the use of 
Article 1F(b) could avoid the seemingly unnecessary (and 
potentially) embarrassing determination of whether the 
United States is a jurisdiction that fails to provide suitable 
legal protections. It focuses on the fact that the individual in 
question belongs to an excludable class of persons—crimin-
als as a result of their act of desertion. The likely reason that 
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tribunals and courts do not exclude asylum-seekers on the 
basis of such a designation may well be the fact that they 
implicitly recognize such desertions, as well as others, for 
what they are: political crimes. This is particularly so when 
the desertion is the manifestation of a selective conscien-
tious objection in accordance with paragraph 171 of the 
UNCHR Handbook.62 All of this stands to reason that if 
desertion from the military during a time of armed conflict 
is a political crime (in addition to being designated a mili-
tary crime too), this should give rise to concerns about the 
level of protection any state will practically be able to give 
during a criminal prosecution with respect to such a politi-
cal criminal.
Paragraph 171 Desertions
It may cause consternation for some to regard desertions as 
“pure” political crimes as a matter of law, for the perception 
may be that it will open the floodgates for every military 
deserter to claim refugee status. Yet in order for deserters 
to secure refugee status, it must be shown that prosecu-
tion and any punishments that arise therefrom amount to 
persecution. That persecution must also be connected to a 
Convention ground, including political opinion. Not every 
desertion motivated by political opinions will justify the 
granting of refugee status. To recall, paragraph 171 of the 
UNCHR Handbook provides that
[n]ot every conviction, genuine though it may be, will constitute 
a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or 
draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in disagreement 
with his government regarding the political justification for a 
particular military action. Where, however, the type of military 
action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is 
condemned by the international community as contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion 
could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in 
itself be regarded as persecution.63
As such, even if desertion is to be considered a pure polit-
ical crime, within the context of an inclusion analysis under 
Article 1A(2) there is still the necessity to determine whether 
the well-founded fear of persecution has a nexus to, in this 
case, a political opinion. That political opinion, however, 
must also be connected to such military conduct that is con-
demned by the international community as contrary to the 
basic rules of human conduct.
Although paragraph 171 does not spell out what actions 
fall within its purview, case law from Canada and other 
jurisdictions has provided guidance. They include64 the 
refusal to participate or assist in the prosecution of chem-
ical warfare;65 participate in an international armed conflict 
that was initiated without just cause;66 take part in the 
murder of non-combatants;67 fire onto an unarmed group 
of protestors;68 engage in ethnic cleansing;69 participate in 
systematic but non-grave breaches of international humani-
tarian law during the course of military operations;70 arrest 
leaders of political parties and seize their property follow-
ing a military coup d’état;71 follow an order to engage in 
paid assassinations;72 and participate in the persecution of 
an identified class of people based on race or some other 
prohibited ground.73
Paragraph 171 also indicates that the conduct objected 
to be internationally condemned as being contrary to the 
basic rules of human conduct. There is, however, no con-
sensus as to what constitutes international condemnation. 
Two courts suggest that international condemnation may 
be established through explicit statements of condemnation. 
In its most restrictive incarnation, one US court has articu-
lated that universal condemnation is evidenced through 
statements by international governmental bodies such 
as the United Nations.74 Such an approach is problematic, 
since international bodies are fundamentally political, and 
states may be unwilling to openly criticize and censure other 
states. Doing so may hinder diplomatic relations or spark 
international tensions.75 A Canadian court, by contrast, has 
articulated an alternative approach whereby international 
condemnation may be ascertained through a broader range 
of sources. These include the statements, writings, and 
documented reports of international non-governmental 
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and others.76
Unlike the previous examples, others have questioned 
whether paragraph 171 requires such explicit condemnation 
by international intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organizations. Indeed, paragraph 171 indicates that condem-
nation by the international community is concerned with 
the “type of military action” that the individual refuses to 
be associated with.77 The use of the words “type of” strongly 
suggests that condemnation by the international commun-
ity can, for example, relate to the prohibited use of chemical 
or biological agents more generally without having to locate 
specific statements by international organizations about 
their particular use in a given context.78 Hathaway rightly 
observes that “there is a range of military activity which is 
simply never permissible, in that violates basic international 
standards.”79 He asserts that these would include military 
actions perpetrated with the intent to “violate basic human 
rights, ventures in breach of the Geneva Convention stan-
dards for the conduct of war, and non-defensive incursions 
into foreign territory.”80
Some courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom 
take the position that evidence of condemnation by the 
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international community should merely be relevant but not 
a mandatory or determinative consideration.81 In support, 
one UK tribunal decision suggested that to require condem-
nation by the international community for military deserter 
cases would be incongruous with the general approach 
applied in other refugee claims assessments.82
Amongst the various approaches articulated, the 
approach articulated by Hathaway and pursued by some 
Canadian courts is most consistent with the text of para-
graph 171 and the humanitarian objectives of international 
law. Also, unlike the UK approach, the reference to con-
demnation of the international community as it appears 
in paragraph 171 does not seem to read as merely optional 
language. On the other hand, the need to establish inter-
national condemnation should not require specific and 
express condemnation of new outbreaks of international 
legal violations. As already articulated, certain “types of 
military conduct” have already been generally condemned 
by the international community through the signing and 
ratification of international conventions and the recogni-
tion of certain customary international legal prohibitions.
The high standard that paragraph 171 sets, however, is 
important. Military organizations must be able to main-
tain discipline and to rely on its personnel to obey orders. 
However, this requirement is not to be followed blindly 
in the commission of internationally condemned actions. 
Paragraph 171 furthers important norms and principles 
of international law and the recognition that individual 
soldiers have a responsibility to disobey orders in certain 
contexts.83
Once an applicant establishes that she or he has com-
mitted a “paragraph 171 desertion,” it leads to considerable 
doubts that the state that perpetrates such internationally 
condemned conduct will give the deserting soldier a fair 
and impartial trial. Such states already demonstrate that 
they are willing to commit internationally condemned 
breaches of the basic rules of human conduct. It is at least 
likely that such states will fail to provide basic procedural 
protections with respect to deserting soldiers.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that deserters who seek refugee 
status face particular challenges in obtaining refugee status. 
There has been a presumption in Canadian law that such 
states provide basic guarantees of procedural protections in 
connection with prosecutions regarding desertion (or, for 
that matter, any crimes). I have argued that this presump-
tion should not exist when the prosecution is for desertion, 
given that desertion is an inherently political crime. This 
article has argued that desertions can be characterized as a 
pure political crime, since the primary victim of the offence 
is the state. Lastly, even if desertions are considered pure 
political crimes, it must still be established that the deser-
tion is in accordance with paragraph 171 of the UNCHR 
Handbook.
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